'Reinforcements were never enough to satisfy the Australian government, or check the Japanese. From early January to 5 February, two Indian brigades, the British 18th Division, an Australian machine-gun battalion, nearly 2,000 other men for the 8th Division, and at least 7,000 reinforcements for Indian units reached Singapore. They were too late and too untrained to influence the campaign's result, except to lengthen the prisoner-of-war lists. Much was hoped of fifty-one Hurricanes that reached the island, in crates, on 13 January. On the 20th, on their first mission, they shot down eight of twenty-seven Japanese bombers over Singapore. Next day Zeros escorted the enemy without any Japanese losses. Subsequently, the Hurricanes were steadily whittled away by the superior Zeros.

Until mid-January Australian forces played only a small role in this debacle. The two RAAF Buffalo squadrons lost so many planes they were merged into one squadron on 25 December. The two RAAF Hudson squadrons, evacuated to Sumatra on 20 January, put steadily dwindling numbers into the air over Malaya. Up to seven RAN corvettes swept for mines in Malay waters. HMASs Vampire, Yarra, Hobart and Canberra all escorted convoys to Singapore.'

Air raids on Singapore Island were frequent during the time we were there. We spent part of the first night after arrival in slit trenches, gumbooted, in the water at the bottom.

We would travel to Sime Road daily to work and return in the evening to find Sembawang, especially after 17 January, pitted with new bomb craters and airmen at work repairing them. At Sime Road, during the daytime raids, it was considered very non-U to leave the offices for the trenches. One morning, soon after starting work there, Doug Forder and I were reprimanded by an RAF officer of Air rank for leaving work and adjourning to the slit trench and strongly suggested that we shelter 'under the table' instead—so we soon learnt this was the custom. Many alerts were sounded but work continued until the 'Jim Crows' (men posted for the purpose) warned that enemy aircraft were actually in sight and approaching when they would shout: 'ta-ak coover'!

Bureau of Meteorology