With The Navy (continued)

The movement of small ships and the conveying of supplies and troops to operational areas by sea required constant care. During the early days of the war, shipping was just as important to the Allies as aircraft—and almost as scarce. To send a ship abroad—say from Australia to Milne Bay—in early 1942, was simply asking for its destruction. D.Met.S. was therefore asked to advise when the terminal base would be closed in by weather for an extended period so as to enable the safe hidden passage of a ship, and the discharge of its cargo at a destination without interruption from the enemy lying in wait in New Britain and the Solomon Islands.

The predominance of airpower that emerged in World War II became quickly apparent by the bombing and sinking of many naval vessels on both sides. The swift and spectacular destruction of the two major RN battleships, Repulse and Prince of Wales, by the Japanese air force in December 1941 was illustrative. Aircraft carriers assumed growing importance, and figured significantly in the decisive naval-air engagements in the Coral and Bismarck Seas and off Midway Island. The extent to which the weather could affect such operations has been described in the brief accounts of the first of these two engagements given in an earlier chapter.

Using the weather in warfare was always a gamble, especially in the tropics where no forecast was ever infallible. If weather conditions reversed during an operation—as they often did—the planner who had relied on the original conditions was indeed hoist by his own petard

Bureau of Meteorology